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Skill · DevOps

Github actions advanced

Design, debug, and harden GitHub Actions CI/CD workflows, including reusable workflows, matrix builds, self-hosted runners, OIDC authentication, caching, environments, secrets, and release automation.

Agentic Awesome SkillsAdded Sep 5, 2026
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  2. Add the skill to your AI, one time only: press Copy skill and paste it into your AI's instructions: a project in ChatGPT, Claude or Grok, a Gem in Gemini, an agent in Microsoft 365 Copilot, or a rule in Cursor. It stays there for every new chat. In Kimi, paste it at the start of a new chat.
  3. Ask for the task in your own words, or say it directly:
Use the Github actions advanced skill to help me with this.
SKILL.md2 files in this skill

GitHub Actions Advanced Skill

Expert guidance for designing, writing, debugging, and securing production-grade GitHub Actions workflows.


Detailed Guide

Read [the detailed guide](references/detailed-guide.md) before executing this skill. It retains the complete procedure and reference material. Treat its safety, prerequisites, and validation requirements as mandatory. For focused work, load the relevant sections; for end-to-end work, read the guide completely.

When to Use This Skill

  • User mentions GitHub Actions, .github/workflows, CI/CD pipelines, runners, jobs, steps, or actions
  • User wants to automate builds, tests, deployments, or releases via GitHub
  • User asks about matrix builds, reusable workflows, composite actions, or self-hosted runners
  • User needs help with OIDC authentication, caching strategies, or secrets management
  • User says "my GitHub pipeline is failing" or "set up CI for my repo"
  • User asks about workflow security, hardening, or environment protection rules

When NOT to Use This Skill

  • The user is working with GitLab CI/CD → recommend gitlab-ci-patterns
  • The user is working with CircleCI, Jenkins, or other CI platforms
  • The task is purely about Docker image building without GitHub context → recommend docker-expert
  • The task is about Kubernetes deployment configuration → recommend kubernetes-architect

Security Hardening

1. Always Declare Permissions (Least Privilege)

# Workflow-level default — restrict everything
permissions:
  contents: read

jobs:
  publish:
    # Job-level override — only expand what's needed
    permissions:
      contents: write        # Only for release/publish jobs
      packages: write        # Only for container push jobs
      pull-requests: write   # Only for PR comment jobs
      id-token: write        # Only for OIDC auth jobs

2. Pin Third-Party Actions to Full Commit SHA

# ❌ UNSAFE — tag can be mutated or hijacked
- uses: actions/checkout@v4

# ✅ SAFE — commit SHA is immutable
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683  # v4.2.2

# Tool to automate SHA pinning:
# npx pin-github-action .github/workflows/*.yml
# or: pip install ratchet && ratchet pin .github/workflows/

3. Prevent Script Injection

# ❌ UNSAFE — attacker controls PR title, which gets expanded in shell
- run: echo "${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}"

# ✅ SAFE — pass through environment variable (shell doesn't evaluate it)
- env:
    PR_TITLE: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}
  run: echo "$PR_TITLE"

# ✅ SAFE — expressions in if: conditions are evaluated by Actions, not shell
- if: github.event.pull_request.draft == false
  run: echo "Not a draft"

Never place ${{ ... }} directly inside run: when the value can come from PR metadata, workflow inputs, repository files, matrix JSON, or earlier job outputs. Put it in env: first, validate allowlisted values where possible, and reference the shell variable with quotes.

4. Restrict pull_request_target Usage

# Only run when a maintainer adds a specific label — prevents untrusted execution
on:
  pull_request_target:
    types: [labeled]

jobs:
  validate:
    # Double-guard: check label name AND author_association
    if: |
      github.event.label.name == 'safe-to-test' &&
      (github.event.pull_request.author_association == 'COLLABORATOR' ||
       github.event.pull_request.author_association == 'MEMBER' ||
       github.event.pull_request.author_association == 'OWNER')

5. Harden with StepSecurity

# Add to every workflow — hardens runner, monitors outbound traffic
- uses: step-security/harden-runner@4d991eb9995541a0b71d1b66f1f98a5f1bef422c  # v2.11.0
  with:
    egress-policy: audit          # Start with 'audit', move to 'block' after confirming allowlist
    allowed-endpoints: >
      api.github.com:443
      registry.npmjs.org:443
      objects.githubusercontent.com:443

Limitations

  • Use this skill only when the task clearly matches the scope described above.
  • Do not treat the output as a substitute for environment-specific validation, testing, or expert review.
  • Always test reusable workflows in a feature branch before merging to main.
  • Stop and ask for clarification if required inputs, permissions, safety boundaries, or success criteria are missing.